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ON TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS, THEIR
RECASTING IN TERMS OF BELIEF, AND
THE ENSUING TRANSFORMATION OF
KELSEN'S PURE THEORY OF LAW
Stanley L. Paulson*
INTRODUCrION

Ever since the appearance of Peter Strawson's Individuals, in
1959,1 and The Bounds of Sense, in 1966,2 so-called transcendental arguments have enjoyed a good bit of attention in the philosophical literature.3 Much of this attention manifests a severely critical stance.
Nevertheless, as Robert Stem points out in his forthcoming book,
TranscendentalArguments and Scepticism,4 philosophers of distinctionamong them, Hilary Putnam and Donald Davidson 5- continue to
6
employ transcendental arguments.
In Part I below, I take stock of forty years of discussion directed to
Strawsonian transcendental arguments. I begin, in Section A, with
some remarks on their purpose and form. Then, in Section B, I turn
to a statement and an evaluation of the case against transcendental
* Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy, Washington University, St.
Louis. I delivered an earlier version of this Paper as a guest lecture in Palermo, and I
remain grateful to my hosts there-Bruno Celano, Mirella Urso, Vittorio Villa, and
Francesco Viola-for helpful queries and suggestions. I am grateful, too, to Bonnie
Litschewski Paulson for a number of helpful points.
PETER STRAwSON, INDIVIDUALS: AN ESSAY IN DEsCRIPTIVE METAPHYSICS (1959).
P.F. STRAWSON, THE BouNDs OF SENSE: AN ESSAY ON KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PuRE
REASON (1966).
3 See generally TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS: PROSPECTS AND PERSPEcTVES (Rob1

2

ert Stem ed., 2000) (containing an extensive bibliography prepared by Isabel
Cabrera).

4 See ROBERT STERN, TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS AND ScEPTIcISM (forthcoming
2000). I am indebted to Robert Stem for kindly allowing me to see the manuscript of
his forthcoming book, on which I have drawn at a number of points, as noted below.
5 See DONALD DAVIDSON, INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION 183-225
(1984); HmARY PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY 1-21 (1981).
6 See STERN, supra note 4.
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arguments, known in the literature from, inter alia, Barry Stroud's inventive counterargument to the effect that transcendental arguments
presuppose the applicability of a verification principle and are, therefore, without interest. Finally, in Section C, I take up some details of
recasting transcendental arguments in terms of belief.
Taking stock is not, however, my primary aim. In Part II of the
Article, I try to say something about how this recasting of transcendental arguments in terms of belief plays itself out in legal philosophy,
where, in some circles, Hans Kelsen in particular has been identified
with transcendental arguments. 7 The initial task in Part II, however, is
that of filling in the background with a sketch of a juridico-transcendental argument cast in terms of truth. This is the focus of Section A.
Then, in Section B, I turn to a recasting of the juridico-transcendental
argument in terms of belief. My conclusion, in brief compass, is that
the recasting of the transcendental argument in terms of belief transforms it and thereby any theory beholden to it. In a word, the recasting takes us from a Kantian theory to a naturalistic or Humean theory.
In legal philosophy, the recasting amounts to a transformation of Kelsen's theory into something not unlike H.L.A. Hart's theory.8 In par7 On transcendental arguments as applied to Kelsen's theory and on the role of
Kantian and neo-Kantian philosophy in Kelsen's theory generally, see, for example,
ROBERT Atn'xy, BEGRIFF UND GELTUNG DES RECHTs

154-86 (1992); HORsr

DREIER,

RECH-rSLEHRE, STAATSSOZIOLOGIE UND DEMOKRATIETHEORIE BEI HANS KELSEN 56-90
(1986); CARSTEN HEIDEMANN, DIE NORM ALs TATSACHE: ZUR NORMENTHEORIE HANS

222-42 (1997); Geert Edel, The Hypothesis of the Basic Norm: Hans Kelsen and
Hermann Cohen, in NORMATrvrrY AND NORMS: CRrrICAL PERSPECrVES ON KELSENIAN
THEMES 177 (Stanley L. Paulson & Bonnie Litschewski Paulson eds. & Bonnie Litschewski Paulson et al. trans., 1998) [hereinafter NoRmATIrrv AND NORMS]; Stefan
Hammer, A Neo-Kantian Theory of Legal Knowledge in Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law7, in
NoRMATIVrr AND NORMS, supra, at 195; Hans K6chler, Zur Transzendentalen Struktur
der "Grundnorm," in AUF DEM WEG ZUR MENSCHENWORDE uND GERECHTIGKEIT: FESTSCHRIFT FOR HANS R. KLECArsxy, 505-17 (Ludwig Adamovich & Peter Pernthaler eds.,
1980), reprinted in HANS K6CHLER, PHILOSOPHIE, REcHT, POLrTIK 15-24 (1985) (reKELSENS

printing in part); Gerhard Luf, On the TranscendentalImport of Kelsen's Basic Norm, in
NoRMATIvITY AND NoRms, supra, at 221; Stanley L. Paulson, On the Question of a Cohen-

nian Dimension in Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law, with Attention to Renato Treves's Reconstruction, in DiRrrro, CULTURA E LIBERTA: ATrI DEL CONVEGNO IN MEMORIA DI RENATO
TREVES 219 (Vincenzo Ferrari et al. eds., 1997); Stanley L. Paulson, The Neo-Kantian
Dimension of Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law, 12 OxFoRDJ. LEGAL STUD. 311, 322-32 (1992)
[hereinafter Paulson, Neo-Kantian Dimension]; Robert Alexy, The Nature of Arguments about the Nature of Law (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).

For an older work that is valuable for its Kantian perspective vis-A-vis Kelsen, see WILLIAM EBENSTEIN, THE PuRE THEORY OF LAW (1945), and see also William Ebenstein,
The Pure Theory of Law: Demythologizing Legal Thought, 59 CAL. L. REv. 617 (1971).
8 On the differences, see Norbert Hoerster, Kritischer Vergleich der Theorien der
Rechtsgeltung von Hans Kelsen und H.L.A. Hart, in UNTERSUCHUNGEN ZUR REINEN
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ticular, the recasting undermines one of the fundamental platforms of
Kelsen's doctrine of purity, namely, the normativity thesis, which calls
for a radical separation of law and fact.9
Finally, in these introductory remarks, a word about strategy. In
earlier work, I have argued that even if some version of Kant's transcendental argument is defensible for Kant's own purposes, it does
not follow-and, indeed, is not the case-that a suitably reformulated
version of that transcendental argument likewise applies in one or the
other of the standing disciplines, for example, in legal science as understood by Kelsen. 10 Here the strategy is a bit different. Once again
I am making charitable assumptions about the defensibility of the
transcendental argument as applied to Kant's philosophy. In this instance, however, it is not the case that a suitably reformulated version
of the transcendental argument will have no application to Kelsenian
legal science. Rather, the transcendental argument, recast in terms of
belief, distorts Kelsen's theory beyond recognition.
I.

A.

TAXING STOCK

On the Purpose and Form of TranscendentalArguments

What are transcendental arguments? For an initial answer, it is
well to look both to the ostensible purpose of such arguments and to
their form. In terms of purpose, it is sometimes said that transcendental arguments purport to show that something or other is constitutive
of some aspect of reality." Very often the focus is on experience or
knowledge.' 2 As Quassim Cassam puts it, "Transcendental arguments
are concerned with the specification of conceptually necessary condiREcHTsLEHRE 1-19 (Robert Walter & Stanley L. Paulson eds., 1986), Stanley L. Paulson, ContinentalNormativism and Its British Counterpart:How DfferentAre They ?, 6 RAA-o
Ju s 227 (1993), andjoseph Raz, Kelsen's Theory of the Basic Norm, in NomAvr m AND
NoRms, supra note 7, at 47, 57-60.

9 The doctrine captures one part of the import of Kelsen's "middle way,"
namely, his path between the fact-based legal positivism of the tradition and natural
law theory. See HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 211 (Max Knight trans., 2d ed.
1967); Paulson, Neo-Kantian Dimension, supranote 7, at 313-22;Joseph Raz, The Purity
of the Pure Theory, in NomATsArry AN'D NORMS, supra note 7, at 237, 237-52.
10 See KELSEN, supra note 9, at 71-76, 201-05; Paulson, Neo-Kantian Dimension,
supra note 7.
11

See RUTH WErTRAUB, THE SKEPTICAL CHALLENGE 51 (1997).

12 For many purposes, experience and knowledge come to the same thing in
Kant's work. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, at B 161

(Werner S.

Pluhart trans., Hackett 1996) (1781) ("[Slince experience is cognition through connected perceptions, the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience and
hence hold a priori also for all objects of experience."); see also id. at B 218.
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tions of the possibility of experience."1 3 And this view of why transcendental arguments are adduced is hardly surprising, for they are
familiar, first and foremost, from the context of philosophical skepticism. Thus, where the skeptic denies or at any rate raises doubts
about this or that aspect of reality, one adduces a transcendental argument in reply. Cassam speaks in the quotation above of "necessary
conditions," but he is not to be read as contending that transcendental arguments reach to every imaginable necessary condition for experience or knowledge, say, those neurophysiological conditions whose
satisfaction is understood in the human reception and transmission of
knowledge generally. Rather, the necessary conditions in question are
properly understood as modal conditions, not causal conditions, and
they speak to the most basic aspects of our conceptual schemeI 4 -in
Strawsonian parlance, to the world quaspatiotemporal system containing objective particulars.
The specific twist in transcendental arguments that purports to
mark them as an unusually powerful and devastating weapon in the
arsenal directed against the skeptic is, as Rfidiger Bubner writes, their
"self-referential character." 15 If reasoning about one or another of
the forms of knowledge "is not possible without making use of certain
elements of [ this very] form,"1

6

then the skeptic is not going to be able

to raise doubts about the form of knowledge in question without
thereby employing that form. As one writer puts it, neatly capturing
this feature of transcendental arguments, the skeptic can only make
out his case by "presupposing the truth of the very thing he was doubt17
ing or denying."
Thanks to their self-referential character, transcendental arguments have something in common with speech acts that yield "selfaffirming" and "self-defeating" statements-for example, my saying,
respectively, the words "I am speaking now" and the words "I do not
exist." Addressing the latter case, Jaakko Hintikka asks, "What general
13 Quassim Cassam, Transcendental Arguments, Transcendental Synthesis and TranscendentalIdealism, 37 PHIL. Q. 355, 355 (1987).
14 See generally MAx SCHELER, DIE TRANSSZENDENTALE LND DIE PSYCHOLOGISCHE
METHODE 36--38 (1900), reprinted in 1 MAX SCHELER, GESAMMELTE WERKE (FWhe
Schriften) 197, 227-28 (Maria Scheler & Manfred S. Frings eds., 1972); Rfidiger
Bubner, Kant, TranscendentalArguments and the Problem of Deduction, 28 REv. METAPHrSiCs 453, 461 (1974); STERN, supra note 4.
15 Bubner, supra note 14, at 460, 464 passim.
16 Id. at 464 (emphasis added).
17 Ross Harrison, Wie man dem Transzendentalen Ich Einen Sinn Verleiht (Wolfgang
R. K6hler trans.), in

KANTs TRANSZENDENTALE DEDUKTION UND DIE M6GLICHKErr VON

TRANSZENDENTALPHILOSOPHIE

1988).

32, 34-35 (Forum ffir Philosophie Bad Homburg ed.,
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characteristic of the sentence 'De Gaulle does not exist' makes it awkward for De Gaulle to assert it?" '

He answers in terms of a doctrine

of existential inconsistency: 'We shall say that p is existentially inconsistent for the person referred -to by a to utter if and only if the longer
sentence 'p and a exists' is inconsistent (in the ordinary sense of the
word) ."19
This is fine as far as it goes, which is not very far. Hintikka's doctrine of existential inconsistency is indeed a counterpart to something
like what Bubner suggests in the name of the self-referential character
of transcendental arguments, but the doctrine addresses only this one
aspect of transcendental arguments and not at all what they purport
to accomplish. This latter point takes us full circle, back to the question of the purpose for which transcendental arguments are adduced.
One commentator has addressed the question of purpose in terms of
the "something extra" that marks transcendental arguments proper,
namely, that they are concerned "with the conditions under which
certain highly general concepts-like the concept of other minds or
of the existence of body in general-have application, given that such
concepts play a key role in entire discourses and are central to our
20
thought and talk as a whole."
A transcendental argument might be set out, according to Stem's
scheme, 2 1 as having the form: an initial premise, "I am thinking that
X" or "I have the concept Y," followed by a second, transcendental
premise to the effect that my thinking that X-or my having the concept Y-is possible only if Z From the conjunction of these premises,
a conclusion follows to the effect that Zis the case. And the existence
of Zis incompatible with the doubts raised by the skeptic. Thus, drawing on the only familiar use of a transcendental argument in legal
theory, one begins with an initial premise of, say, the concept of
normativity as something given, then adds a second premise, namely,
that what is given is possible only if a peculiarly juridico-normative
category is at hand. And therefore-the conclusion-this category is
undeniably at hand.2 2 Or so the argument runs.
Drawing, for a second illustration, on a scheme that directly reflects something of Kant's enterprise (or, at any rate, one reading of
Kant's enterprise), I might turn to Ralph Walker, who sets out the
form of the transcendental argument this way:
18 Jaakko Hintikka, Cogito, Ergo Sum: Inference orPerformance?,71 PHIL. REv. 3, 10
(1962).
19 Id. at 11.
20 A.C. GRAYLING, THE REFurTATION OF ScErncisM 82 (1985).
21 See STERN, supra note 4, ch. III.
22 For some details, see infra Part II.A.
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1. We have experience (or knowledge).
2. If there is experience (or knowledge), p must be true.
23
3. Therefore, p.
In the Kantian context, the proposition "p" gives expression to the
applicable Kantian category, or at least implies, together with further
steps, a proposition in which the Kantian category is given expression.
Walker's representation of the "modem" transcendental argument
thus invites attention to the link between the recent effort in the field
and Kant's own argument in the transcendental analytic of the Critique of PureReason.2 4 Afortiori for Strawson, whose book Individuals is
Kantian in character, and whose later treatise, The Bounds of Sense, purports expressly to reconstruct aspects of the argument of the transcendental analytic of Kant's first Critique.25 The challenge to the viability
2 6
of transcendental arguments stems, above all, from Barry Stroud.
B.

Stroud's Challenge

Stroud launches his own argument in the course of examiningand then, as we shall see, extending in a certain way-Strawson's argument in Individuals, the latter being Stroud's point of departure. It is
useful to begin with Strawson's conclusion, namely, that which he takes
the skeptic to be doubting or denying:
27
(5) Objects continue to exist unperceived.
At the beginning of his argument, Strawson asserts that the skeptic's doubts about the unperceived continued existence of objectsdoubts directed, in other words, to (5), Strawson's conclusion-make
sense only if premise (1) is true:
(1) We think of the world as containing objective particulars in a
28
single spatiotemporal system.
This initial premise, Strawson says, reflects "our conceptual scheme," 2 9
the way we think about the world.
Stroud's moves reflect Strawson's strategy. What, Stroud asks on
behalf of Strawson, are the necessary conditions for our thinking
23 RALPH C.S. WALKER, KANT 10 (1978). From a standpoint critical of Strawson,
Walker offers a useful general statement on transcendental arguments. See id,at
9-27.
24 KANT, supra note 12.
25 See STRAWSON, supra note 2.
26 See Barry Stroud, TranscendentalArguments, 65 J. PHIL. 241, 241-56 (1968).
27 I have taken over the form of the argument from Stroud. See id
28 Id. at 245.
29 Id. (following Strawson's strategy in STRAWSON, supra note 1, at 15).
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about the world in the way we do? The question is fundamental, for,
Strawson believes, adducing the appropriate necessary conditions will
demonstrate that the skeptic's doubts are illegitimate on the ground
that "they amount to a rejection of some of the necessary conditions
of the existence of the conceptual scheme within which alone such
doubts make sense."3 0 This might be termed a statement of Strawson's
strategy, a strategy to which I have in effect already alluded in adumbrating the idea of the self-referential character of transcendental
arguments.
In Strawson's strategy, his point of departure is the assumption
that the skeptic is to be understood as denying (5), the conclusion.
And if, in denying (5), the skeptic is denying the truth of something
that is a necessary condition for the intelligibility of his denial of (5),
namely, premise (1), then the promise of Strawson's strategy is fulfilled. For the denial of (1) undermines in a perfectly straightforward
way the very sense of the skeptic's doubt. As Strawson himself puts it,
the skeptic illegitimately "pretends to accept a conceptual scheme, but
at the same time quietly rejects one of the conditions of its employment."31 Of course, the promise of Strawson's strategy will be fulfilled
only if (5) does indeed follow from (1), such that the denial of (5)
implies the denial of (1).
Stroud argues that (5) does not follow from (1). To pursue his
argument, it is necessary to fill in the intermediate premises of Strawson's argument. Strawson's premise (2) is, he says, a necessary truth:
(2) If we think of the world as containing objective particulars in a
single spatiotemporal system, then we are able to identify and
32
reidentify particulars.
And if (2) is true, Strawson argues, then premise (3) is also true:
(3) If we can reidentify particulars, then we have criteria on the
33
basis of which we can do so.

This is as far as Strawson goes, in Individuals. In his view, the
conclusion, (5), follows from the conjunction of premises (1), (2),
and (3). If Strawson is right, the position he has developed will indeed reflect his strategy, thereby providing a devastating reply to the
skeptic. For, repeating the statement of Strawson's strategy, the skeptic can raise doubts about the unperceived continuing existence of
objects only by rejecting some of the necessary conditions-captured
30

Id. (following Strawson's strategy in STRAWSON, supra note 1, at 35).

31 Id.
32 Again, all of this follows Stroud's reconstruction. See id.
33 Id

1782

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL- 75:5

here by (1), (2), and (3)-for the very conceptual scheme within
which alone such doubts make sense.
To summarize thus far: If the skeptic's denial of (5) is to make
sense, then (1) must be true. But, Strawson is arguing, once (5) is
denied, the denial of (1) follows. In other words, premise (1), on the
skeptic's reading, is not true, but then the skeptic's denial of (5)
makes no sense.
All of this represents Strawson's position, as restated by Stroud.
Stroud's own position, as already noted above, is that (5) does not
follow from the conjunction of (1), (2), and (3). As Stroud puts it,
The most that has been explicitly established is that if the skeptic's
statement makes sense then we must have... criteria on the basis of
which we can reidentify a presently observed object as numerically
the same as one observed earlier, before a discontinuity in our perception of it. And this does not imply that objects continue to exist
unperceived if it is possible for all reidentification statements to be
false even though they are asserted on the basis of the best criteria
we . ..have for reidentification

34

It will be enough, Stroud is contending on behalf of the skeptic, if
we believe that objects exist unperceived. 35 I return to this central
point in Section C below.
Stroud then extends Strawson's argument, thereby showing that
it can in fact be saved, but only at an enormous cost: to save the argument is to render it trivial.
Stroud argues, in particular, that Strawson needs premise (4):
(4) If we know that the best criteria we have for the reidentification
of particulars have been met, then we know that objects continue to exist unperceived.
Stroud claims that (4) is either a suppressed premise of Strawson's argument or a statement of what Strawson means by "criteria for
reidentification of particulars."3 6 In either case, Stroud argues, (4) is
necessary if Strawson is to move beyond a claim of belief to a claim of
knowledge. But now, Stroud continues, the argument
comes down to the claim that if we think of the world as containing
objective particulars, then it must be possible for us to know whether
objects continue to exist unperceived. We could not make sense of
the notion of unperceived continued existence without having crite34 Id. at 246.
35 This theme is developed at length in GRAYLING, supra note 20, at 2-9, 107-13,
and in P.F. STRAIWSON, SKEPrICISM AND NATURALIsM: SOME VARIETIES 1-27 (1985).
36 Stroud, supra note 26, at 246.
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ria of identification, and if we have such criteria then we can some37
times know whether objects continue to exist unperceived.
Stroud identifies his result here as an application of the verification
principle, an application amounting to the claim that we are able to
confirm or disconfirm statements about the unperceived continued
existence of objects. As Stroud puts it, the notion of objective particulars makes sense only if, at least in some instances, we can establish
that certain conditions have been fulfilled, "which logically implies...
38
that objects continue to exist unperceived."
The point of Stroud's counterargument is clear: if Strawson's argument in enriched form works, it is an application of the verification
principle. The result is a dilemma for Strawson. If he forgoes the
appeal to the verification principle, his argument has no force. But if
he does appeal to the verification principle, then it meets and answers
the skeptic's argument directly, and the transcendental argument is
39
rendered superfluous.
Stroud's argument and the dilemma he thereby poses for Strawson strike me as sound. The question then arises: can anything of
Strawson's position be salvaged? Arguably, something can be, namely,
the far weaker conclusion to the effect that one believes that objects
exist unperceived. I have alluded to this weaker conclusion above, but
a bit of its background ought to be set out here on the merits, so to
speak.
C.

Recasting TranscendentalArguments in Terms of Belief

The recasting of transcendental arguments in terms of belief can
be presented in three rounds. In an initial round, there is the skeptic's case as it is addressed to ordinary empirical judgments, along with
the reply thereto. If the skeptic can be answered in the initial round,
that is, if-as I shall assume-it can be shown that ordinary empirical
judgments are not vulnerable to the skeptic's argument, then, in a
second round, the skeptic will turn to the more fundamental propositions that were presupposed in answering the skeptic in the initial
round. Following A.C. Grayling, 40 I take up these more fundamental
propositions under the rubric of a "conceptual scheme." The effort
here to answer the skeptic turns on making a case on behalf of a single
conceptual scheme-a critical point, for the alternative leads to a
37

Id. at 246-47 (emphasis added).

38 1d at 247.
39 See id
40 I follow Grayling in The Refutation of Scepticism, not only here but throughout
the present section. See generally GRAYLING, supra note 20.
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form of relativism. Finally, in round three, the transcendental arguments themselves, understood now as speaking to basic beliefs, come
to the fore. As noted above, a part of this case has already been made.
In taking up ordinary empirical judgments-which the skeptic's
case addresses in the first round-it is useful to begin with a familiar
distinction from Kant. In the Critique of Pure Reason, and in the
Prolegomena, Kant distinguishes between objective empirical judgments and merely subjective judgments. 4 1 An example of the former
is, "This stone is heavy," and of the latter, "This stone seems to me to
be heavy." Kant argues that objective reference is essential to the former, a feature of objective empirical judgments that he explains by
appealing to the applicable intellectual category. By the same token,
the status of merely subjective judgments is owing to the lack of any
role for the intellectual categories therein. The skeptic, challenging
the case made on behalf of objective empirical judgments, contends
that in the end so-called objective empirical judgments are not distinguishable from their subjective counterparts.
How might the skeptic be answered in this initial round? One
tack is to begin with phenomenalism and, in the course of replying to
the phenomenalist, to attempt to tease out the rudiments of an alternative to phenomenalism, say, a naturalist position vis-a-vis empirical
judgments. The proponents of phenomenalism in its different forms,
including John Stuart Mill, Bertrand Russell (at one point in his career), and AJ. Ayer, sought to restate objective empirical judgments
in terms of a purely sensory ("phenomenal") language. 42 Now as
Strawson has pointed out, the phenomenalist presupposes that it is
possible to construct sense experience-as recorded, say, in Ayer's
"purely sensory vocabulary" 43-entirely apart from the objects to
which that experience refers. But how, Strawson asks, could experience-as reconstructed in Ayer's phenomenalist language-be identified without appealing to the very objects to which it refers? 44 And if
"descriptions of sense experience carry such reference," 4 5 then there
is no basis for proceeding as though this experience might be reconstructed independently of the references found in descriptions of it.
With that, the phenomenalist project collapses.
41
TURE

See KANT, supra note 12, at B 142; IMMANUEL KANT, PROLEGOMENA TO ANY FuMETAPHYSICS §§ 18-22 (Gary Hatfield ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997)

(1783) [hereinafter

PROLEGOMENA].

TRUTH AND LoGic 63-68 (1936).
43 A.J. Ayer, Has Austin Refuted the Sense-Datum Theory?, 18 SYNTHESE 117 (1967).
44 See GRAYLING, supra note 20, at 17, 140-43. See generally Peter F. Strawson, Perception and Its Objects, in PERCEPTION AND IDENTITY 41-60 (G.L. Macdonald ed., 1979).
45 GRAYLING, supra note 20, at 17.
42

See, e.g., AJ.

AYER, LANGUAGE,
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This, I take it, represents the received opinion, at least insofar as
the rejection of phenomenalism is concerned. Interesting issues arise,
however, in attempting to state the assertability conditions for what
Kant termed objective empirical judgments, 4 6 once it is granted that
their reference to objects is essential. Here Grayling's monograph,
The Refutation of Scepticism, is unusually suggestive. 47 Grayling argues
that when one asserts, say, "This stone is heavy," the speaker's knowledge is two-fold. The speaker knows, first, which terms in the language are correlated with which objects in experience and, second,
how to recognize the features of his experience to which such terms
48

apply.

To be sure, the speaker is going to make mistakes, a fact that
Grayling takes account of with a theory of error.4 9 Where the
speaker's judgment is made on the basis of the best reading of the
evidence available, we say that the judgment is "warranted." The warrant is defeasible, however; it can be defeated by an appropriate showing that the judgment does not comport with the best reading of the
evidence available.
Of course, before one could justifiably appeal to a scheme of assertability conditions and a theory of error, with an eye to answering
the skeptic on ordinary empirical judgments, a good deal more would
have to be said. For example, "general beliefs" reflecting, inter alia,
the prevailing view of science at any given point in time are simply
taken for granted here, but in a more complete statement something
of their character would have to be spelled out, too.50 My aim here is
simply to say enough, in connection with what I am calling the first
round, to indicate the direction that the rejoinder to the skeptic
might take.
The skeptic, defeated in the initial round, now adduces an argument addressed to the justifying apparatus that underlies the case
made on behalf of empirical judgments. For the sake of simplicity,
the underlying apparatus may be termed a "conceptual scheme." The
skeptic attempts to show that the conceptual scheme in question is
just one of many such schemes, thereby introducing a radical element
of relativism that, if defensible, undermines the philosopher's claims,
in the first round, on behalf of the objectivity of empirical judgments.
46
47
48
49
50

See KANT, supra note 12, at B 142; KANT,
See GRAYLNG, supra note 20, at 20-34.
See id at 31.
See iii at 20-34.
See id at 10-14.

PROLEGOMENA,

supra note 41.
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What is a conceptual scheme? Davidson writes,
Conceptual schemes, we are told, are ways of organizing experience; they are systems of categories that give form to the data of
sensation; they are points of view from which individuals, cultures,
or periods survey the passing scene. There may be no translating
from one scheme to another, in which case the beliefs, desires,
hopes, and bits of knowledge that characterize one person have no
true counterparts for the subscriber to another scheme. Reality itself is relative to1a scheme: what counts as real in one system may
5
not in another.
That "[r] eality itself is relative to a scheme" is not, as we shall see, a
view that Davidson endorses. He is simply reporting on others' views.
One developed view of conceptual schemes is defended by Rudolf Carnap in the name of "internal" and "external" questions. They
are addressed, as he puts it, to the "framework,"52 and the scheme
leads in a straightforward way to a form of relativism. Reviewing,
briefly, Carnap's theory and the rejoinder thereto serves as a useful
53
introduction to the problem.
Carnap argues that ordinary empirical judgments pose "internal"
questions, and these questions can be answered within the context of
the given framework. "External" questions, on the other hand, raise
issues that reach to the framework itself. 54 To say that a concept is

understood scientifically is to say that it is "an element of the system;
hence this concept cannot be meaningfully applied to the system itself."'5 5 The only questions that can be posed and answered "externally" are practical questions-whether, for example, it is defensible
to have adopted this or that framework in the first place.
Objections to Carnap's theory point out the relativistic implications of his view. Grayling, for example, writes that the "is"/"seems"
distinction, familiar, inter alia, from Kant's distinction between objective empirical judgments and merely perceptual judgments, is lost altogether in Carnap's scheme. 5 6 The concept of objectivity is lost for
51
52

DAVIDSON,

supra note 5, at 183.

Rudolph Camap, Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology, 11 REVUE INTERNATIONALE
DE PHILOSOPHIE 20, 21 (1950), reprinted in RUDOLPH CARNAP, MEANING AND NEcEssrrv

205, 206 (1956).
53 Camap's views have been discussed widely. See, e.g., GRAYLING, supranote 20, at
41-49; A.W. Burks, On the Significance of Carnap'sSystem of Inductive Logicfor the Philoso-

phy of Induction, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF RUDOLPH CARNAP 739-59 (Paul Arthur Schilpp
ed., 1963); Barry Stroud, The Significance of Scepticism, in TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS
AND SCIENCE 277-97 (Peter Bieri et al. eds., 1979).
54

See CARNAp, supra note 52, at 207.

55

Id.

56

See GRAYLING, supra note 20, at 43-44.

200o]

ON TRANSCENDENTAL

ARGUMENTS

1787

want of a concept of subjectivity and vice versa. And if a concept of
subjectivity is fundamental to the explication of our concept of experience, as Kant and Strawson both argue, then the concept of experience is lost, too.
Beyond the rejoinder to Carnap, the greater task of answering
the skeptic in this second round is to provide a general argument that
counts against a plurality of conceptual schemes. Such an argument,
it scarcely need be added, is a major undertaking, and I can only indicate here the direction it might take. Happily, Davidson has done
pathbreaking work, and it will suffice for my purposes to introduce his
argument briefly.
Something of the thrust of Davidson's argument can be anticipated by recalling more or less familiar contrasts from cultural anthropology.5 7 For example, Navaho Indians discriminate between two
shades of black, but not between blue and green, whereas our own
color discrimination is precisely the opposite. The contrast suggests a
species of cultural relativity, but does not point to anything like "distinct conceptual schemes." As Grayling explains, differences, "so far
from sealing off one scheme from another, are recognisable as differences only because the schemes are mutually accessible-which is to
58
say, because translation is possible."
The issue becomes markedly more difficult as soon as one turns
to cases in which translation-as per W.V.O. Quine's argument 5 9-is
said to be impossible. By "indeterminacy of translation," Quine has in
mind not (what would be) a mistaken thesis about the inability to
translate from one natural language into another, but the philosophical thesis that, as he puts it, synonymy relations cannot be established
above the level of stimulus-meanings of sentences. Thus, one cannot
be sure which of various translations of a term exhaustively captures
its sense, for its stimulus conditions underdetermine the construction
that ought to be placed on it.60 Indeterminacy of translation marks,
in effect, a variety of conceptual schemes, and they, in turn, portend
relativism.
Davidson, sympathetic to aspects of Quine's program, resists the
relativistic thrust of the indeterminacy thesis. He argues, first, that we
cannot make sense of total failure of translation and, second, that partial failure presupposes some common ground, a "foundation-some
57 See DAVIDSON, supra note 5, at 184;
58 GRAYLING, supra note 20, at 56.
59

60
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See WiuAR VAN ORMAN QumIN, WORD AND OBjcT 26-79 (1960).
See id. at 61-79.
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foundation-in agreement." 6 1 The case against total failure of translation merits a closer look.
Quine's rejection of the "two dogmas" of empiricism-the analytic-synthetic distinction and reductionism-does not lead to total
failure of translation. Or so Davidson argues. If, for example, the
abandonment of the analytic-synthetic distinction leads straightaway
to the abandonment of any sharp distinction between theory and language, the upshot might well seem to be a formula for new conceptual
schemes. "We get a new out of an old scheme when the speakers of a
language come to accept as true an important range of sentences they
previously took to be false (and, of course, vice versa).,,62 Still, Davidson continues, it is hard to see how, on this basis, we could recognize
B as a new conceptual scheme if ex hypothesi it is said to be utterly
different from A, the old scheme. If, on the other hand, one can
point to common ground between B and A, that counts decisively
against the claim that B is truly an utterly different scheme.
The general point has already been anticipated with the example
of color discrimination. Recognizing the difference between the Navaho Indians' color discrimination and our own presupposes some
common ground. As Davidson puts it, referring to Thomas Kuhn's
talk of incommensurable systems of concepts as marking distinct "paradigms" before and after a revolution in science: "Kuhn is brilliant at
saying what things were like before the revolution using-what else?63
our post-revolutionary idiom."
If the case against relativism and so against the skeptic can be
made, in this second round, the skeptic will turn, in a third and final
round, to the soundness of transcendental arguments themselves.
Here, as we have seen, the skeptic is successful, with Stroud doing the
honors. Nothing in this third round, however, counts against the view
that transcendental arguments support a case made in terms of one's
belief in the unperceived continued existence of objects. Indeed, the
skeptics themselves-Stroud is a prominent example here, too-have
granted the point, and Strawson himself has come around to seeing
things this way. As he writes,
[E]ven if we have a tenderness for transcendental arguments, we
shall be happy to accept the criticism of Stroud and others that either such arguments rely on an unacceptably simple verificationism
or the most they can establish is a certain sort of interdependence
of conceptual capacities and beliefs: e.g
61
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intelligible formulation of skeptical doubts to be possible or, more
generally, in order for self-conscious thought and experience to be
possible, we must take it, or believe, that we have knowledge of external physical objects or other minds.64
Returning to the argument of the first round, namely, ordinary
empirical judgments along with the case made on their behalf in
terms of assertability conditions, and holding onto the conclusion
drawn in the second round, the defense of a single conceptual
scheme, one can begin to appreciate the role that might be played by
the belief in the existence of objects. In the first round, the question
arose: what is the explanation of the speaker's knowledge of the correlation between language and objects in the world and, likewise, the
explanation of his ability to recognize and apply such correlations in
particular cases? At least a part of the answer here lies in the speaker's
belief in the existence of objects. That belief provides, as Grayling
65
puts it, the warrant for perceptual judgments.
It is a recasting of transcendental arguments in terms of belief
that I want now to examine vis-A-vis Kelsen's legal philosophy. It will
be well, however, to back up a step or two in order to consider, initially, a juridical counterpart of Kant's transcendental argument as
cast in terms not of belief but of truth.

II.

THE ENSUING TRANSFORMAINON OF KELSEN'S LEGAL THEORY
A.

A Juridico-TranscendentalArgument

In a well-known line in the Critiqueof PureReason, Kant writes that
he is using "transcendental" to speak of cognition or knowledge that is
concerned "not so much with the objects of cognition as with our way
66
of cognizing objects in general insofar as this is possible a priori."
This distinctively Kantian reading of "transcendental" flags the conditions for the possibility of cognition. And in posing a series of transcendental questions-"How is pure mathematics possible?" "How is
pure natural science possible?" "How is metaphysics as science possible?" 67-Kant is in every instance pursuing a variation on the same
theme: how is knowledge or cognition possible?

64 STRAWSON, supra note 35, at 21.
65 See GRAYLrNG, supra note 20, at 108.
66 KANT, supra note 12, at 64.

67 Id. at 60, 62.
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Kelsen formulates a juridical version of the transcendental question. In his paper, Legal Science and the Law, 68 he alludes to a formula-

tion of the transcendental question proferred by his young colleague
Fritz Sander 6 9 and then, in PhilosophicalFoundations,70 Kelsen poses
the transcendental question himself. how is positive law qua object of
cognitive legal science possible? 7 1 Much later, in the second edition
of Pure Theory of Law, 72 he offers a far more fully elaborated formulation of the same transcendental question, this time explicitly drawing
out the analogy to Kant.
Kant asks: "How is it possible, apart from all metaphysics, that the
facts perceived by our senses be interpreted in laws of nature formulated by natural science?" In the same way, the Pure Theory of Law
asks: "How is it possible, without recourse to metalegal authorities
like God or nature, that the subjective meaning of certain material
facts be interpreted as a system of objectively valid legal norms that
73
can be described in legal propositions?"
A version of the Kantian transcendental argument, understood as
Kelsen's response to a juridical version of the transcendental question, is arguably implicit in the basic norm. Introducing the legal
"ought" or "Sollen" as his fundamental category,7 4 Kelsen adumbrates
something like a transcendental proof.75 To the extent that the re-

quired proof can be reconstructed on the basis of Kelsen's text, he
may be seen as having thereby demonstrated the fundamental category of "ought" or "Sollen" as the presupposition of the normative
character of legal rules. Casting a reconstructed version of the argument in terms of cognition, it might run as follows:
1. One has cognition of legal norms (given).
2. Cognition of legal norms is possible only if the category of
"ought" or "Sollen" is presupposed (transcendentalpremise).
68
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3. Therefore, the category of "ought" or "Sollen" is presupposed
(transcendental conclusion).
The argument, as sketched here, is "regressive" in form. The "regressive" or "analytic" character of the argument is something that
Kant himself explicates in the Prolegomena:
[The] analytic method ...means that one starts from what is being
looked for, as if it were given, and ascends to the conditions under
which alone it is possible ....[I] t might be better to call [the analytic method] the regressive method to distinguish it from the syn76
thetic or progressive method.
The regressive argument proceeds, so to speak, backwards. The
starting point is something known, which is set out as given, and then
its presuppositions are established. As depicted here, the regressive
argument is logically valid. 77 The problem with the argument, however, turns not on logical validity but on soundness, namely: is the
second premise true? I return to the question below.
First, however, it is well to look briefly at the other species of argument to which Kant alludes in the Prolegomena. The progressive version of the transcendental argument proceeds, so to speak, forwards.
From a very weak initial premise-in Kant's own theory of knowledge,
it gives expression to the data of consciousness-one proceeds to
demonstrate, via a number of steps, the intellectual categories. Beginning with a statement "P," understood to be true, but which can only
be true if a further statement, "Q," is true, the progressive argument,
greatly compressed, has the following form:
1. P.
2. P is possible only if Q.
3. Therefore Q.
In Kant's theory of knowledge, "P" stands for the data of consciousness, and "Q"-after a number of intermediate steps-for the
applicable Kantian category (most prominently, the category of causality). Once "Q" is derived (in line 3 of the argument), then-after
more intermediate steps-further derivations might be made (demonstrating, in Kantian parlance, the laws of nature as synthetic a priori
propositions). These further derivations may be represented by "R"
in the present sketch of the argument. That is,
4. Therefore R
76 KANT, supra note 41, § 5 at 28 n. (altering translation slightly).
77 Strictly speaking, the argument is enthymematic, but the point is of no interest.
That is, after premise one there is a missing premise-namely, "That which is the case
is possible"-but it is trivial.
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The derived conclusion of the progressive argument is, in fact, the
starting point, premise 1, of the regressive argument.
Kant's progressive argument, in the Critique of Pure Reason, is
highlighted in its use as a response to the skeptic, in particular the
skeptical challenge of the philosopher David Hume. The force of
Kant's argument, if it is sound, is to show that the skeptic cannot help
but undermine his own position in the course of defending it-yet
another allusion, here, to what Bubner has termed the self-referential
78
character of the transcendental argument.
I return, now, to the question left open earlier in this Section,
namely, whether the second premise of the regressive version of Kelsen's juridico-transcendental argument is true-that is, the assertion
that normative cognition presupposes the category of "ought" or "Sollen." Here one has nothing very encouraging to say. Even if Strawson's argument or something like it were sound, the juridical
counterpart of the argument would nevertheless fail. For there is a
fundamental disanalogy between the two arguments. The appeal of
Kant's argument-sound argument or not-lies in the idea that at
this ground level, there is no alternative account of the data-that is,
no alternative to the argument that Kant adduces in the transcendental analytic of the first Critique and that Strawson reconstructs in his
treatise, The Bounds of Sense.79 This point is what the self-referential
character of the argument is supposed to show. Any skeptical effort to
challenge Kant's argument has the challenger presupposing as true
what he claims to be challenging, doubting, or denying. A simple illustration, underscoring the point that we are indeed at the ground
level here, has the skeptic challenging the viability of the principle of
contradiction, which he can scarcely do without presupposing it. As
Kant himself puts it in an early work,
If I now reflect for a moment as to why that which contradicts itself
should be altogether nothing and impossible, I notice that through
it the Principle of Contradiction, the last logical ground of everything thinkable, is destroyed, and that therefore all possibility vanishes, and nothing remains left over to be thought.80
Nothing comparable can be said in the case of the standing disciplines-history, sociology, legal science, and the like-where there is
no suggestion that one is dealing with anything remotely like the ques78
79
80
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tion of the presence or absence of the principle of contradiction.
Rather, the methodological questions in the standing disciplines
speak to alternative means of rendering coherent a certain body of
data. And there will always be alternatives, various methodological
and interpretive approaches to the material. Thus, in the case of legal
science, the skeptic vis-A-vis Kelsenian normative legal science has no
reason to follow Kelsen's lead and will set out instead, say, a "legal
realist" interpretation. Since "making sense of the data," rendering
them coherent, is the only desideratum at hand, the skeptic is on solid
ground whenever and wherever it is the data of this or that standing
discipline that are in question.
What, then, can be said on behalf of recasting the juridico-transcendental argument in terms of belief?
B.

Recasting theJuridico-TranscendentalArgument in Terms of Belief

Turning to the regressive version of Kelsen's juridico-transcendental argument and recasting it in terms of belief is a matter of addressing, in particular, the second premise of the argument. It will
now run something like this:
2. Cognition of legal norms is possible only if one believes that the
category of "ought" or "Sollen" is operative (transcendentalpremise,
recast in terms of belief).
The conclusion of the argument is to be adjusted accordingly.
3. Thus, one believes that the category of "ought" or "Sollen" is operative (transcendental conclusion, recast in terms of belief).
Of course this recasting will be viable only if one is proceeding on the
assumption, as before, that one has cognition of legal norms and also
on the assumption, which is new, that the greater enterprise still
makes sense, with claims of cognition now resting on a mere belief
that the category of "ought" or "Sollen" is operative.
Proceeding on these assumptions-and the latter is, to be sure,
problematic-the recasting triggers a radical shift in the character of
Kelsen's theory. To appreciate this, one has to begin with the standard reading of Kelsen's theory. According to it, Kelsen develops the
Pure Theory of Law on two fronts. On one front, he is understood as
sharing common ground with traditional, fact-based legal positivism.
That is, he like other legal positivists rejects the morality thesis of natural law theory, defending instead its contradictory, the separation thesis. On a second front, however, Kelsen's theory represents a dramatic
departure from the fact-based legal positivism of the tradition. While
the proponents of traditional legal positivism defend a facticity the-
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sis-in a word, the idea that the law is in the end fully explicable in
terms of fact-Kelsen defends a normativity thesis instead, the contradictory of the facticity thesis. This, to repeat, represents a standard
reading of Kelsen's theory.8 1
When we recast Kelsen's argument in terms of belief, however, we
transform the theory into something more like the fact-based legal
positivism of the tradition, the very view that Kelsen rejected in his
own work.8 2 In particular, the recasting of the juridico-transcendental
argument in terms of belief calls to mind the internal point of view in
83
H.L.A. Hart's theory. In a well-known passage in The Concept of Law,
Hart quite properly denies that the internal aspect of rules is a mere
matter of feelings in contrast to externally observable physical behavior. Rather, he continues,
What is necessary is that there should be a critical reflective attitude
to certain patterns of behaviour as a common standard, and that
this should display itself in criticism (including self-criticism), demands for conformity, and in acknowledgements that such criticism
84
and demands are justified.
The rejection of a crude view of the internal aspect of rules in terms of
feelings is not the rejection of a fact-based theory of law. What Hart
develops as an alternative to traditional, fact-based legal positivism is
another fact-based theory. The difference, Hart contends, is that the
facts he employs are social facts, significant in that they withstand the
reductive move familiar from the tradition.
Recasting Kelsen's juridico-transcendental argument in terms of
belief brings him, I am suggesting, close to Hart's view-a fact-based
legal theory qua social facts. In place of the normativity thesis, Kelsen,
like Hart, is now defending a version of the facticity thesis.
Joseph Raz, drawing on the normativity thesis along with a particular reading of Kelsen's doctrine of legal validity qua bindingness,
speaks of Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law as a theory of 'Justified normativity," by contrast to Hart's theory, which Raz describes in terms of
"social normativity."8 5 Whereas "[t] he concepts of the normativity of
the law and of the obligation to obey it" are linked only contingently
in the theory of social normativity, they are linked analytically in Kelsen's theory of justified normativity.8 6 These distinctions would col81
82
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lapse if Kelsen's juridico-transcendental argument were recast in
terms of belief, with the result that both theorists would be defending
the theory of social normativity.
In a word, the juridico-transcendental argument poses a dilemma
for Kelsen: cast in terms of truth, the argument cannot be made to
work. Recasting it in terms of belief transforms his theory, eliminating
the normativity thesis in favor of the facticity thesis, rejecting justified
normativity in favor of social normativity. The dilemma is not, I would
suggest, easily resolved.
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